Saturday, August 16, 2008

Conventional Weapons in Trident Submarines

Time to get a little Navy geeky on you. For the better part of the last 50 years, the US strategic nuclear force consisted of the famous "triad" of long-range bombers, land-based ICBM's in silos, and submarine launched ICBMS. The great thing about the sub-launched leg of the triad was its stealth and survivability; that were an enemy to launch a devastating counterforce strike on the US (against our missile silos and bombers), we'd have a response option. Our "boomer" (ballistic missile submarine) force is currently 14 Ohio Class boats, each with 24 Trident D-5 missile cells (with each missile capable of carrying a number of independently aimed warheads). But the boomers are getting old, and the submarine force is diligently working to replace them.

Currently, the boomer force does one thing and one thing only; it deploys boats out on patrol, where they silently wait for launch orders we hope will never come. It is an expensive but critical mission, and we must continue to invest in keeping this leg of the triad robust (though the triad itself has grown more unbalanced as the bomber force and land based forces have declined faster than the sub force).

It is time to think differently about this capability, and I see evidence that that thinking is well underway. The National Research Council has suggested that we arm our Boomer force with conventional as well as strategic nuclear weapons. Under these scenarios, the ability to have a quick strike option with the capability to target virtually anywhere in the world in under 1 hour gives us a much better ability to deal with what are known in the biz as "fleeting" targets. The big problem with such a capability is that when the boomers went to sea ONLY with nuke missiles in them, any launch detected by overhead assets would set off counterstrike alarm bells in the countries with such a capability...namely Russia and China. By placing conventional warheads on these ICBM's, we put China and Russia in the unenviable position of having to decide if they (or someone else) is being targeted with nukes or conventional weapons. Solving this notification problem is essential to fielding this world-wide quick-strike capability, and I'm glad we are moving down this path. I'd like to get to the point where we don't have anymore "the terrorist just left the compound" issues.

That said, those boomers can do even more than just launch nuclear and conventional ICBMs. We need to move forward with making these stealthy and survivable platforms into truly strategic assets. They must go to sea with a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons, in addition to being able to quickly re-seed satellites that may have been shot down AND to act as part of our missile defense shield by carrying the large missiles necessary for National Missile Defense.

The satellite re-seed capability is essential. We know the Chinese would seek to "punch our eyes out" in battle by targeting our overhead assets. Doing so though is incredibly complex and very, very expensive. Therefore, we should make the proposition dauntingly expensive for them. Put submarines to sea (and land base) with generic, software programmable satellites that can be quickly launched to cover gaps and outages caused by enemy ASAT weapons.

The re-creation of the Ohio Class follow-on as a truly strategic asset is not getting a lot of press today, but inside the Pentagon, strategists are beginning to realize the game-changing nature of this capability.

4 comments:

Anonymous said...

The Russian missile warning system is in the hurt locker. It suffers from material and capabilities shortfall and is prone to false alarms. In an environment marked by increasingly hostile rhetoric and actions between two nations that still own the majority of nuclear weapons to introduce conventional ballistic missiles with intermediate-/intercontinental range that would be launched from areas normally the origin for nuclear weapons would significantly risk a potential alert and launch on the Russians' part. In fact, gven the overtly aggressive military strategy recently released, it is entirely possile they would declare the launch/detection of launch of any missile presumed to fall in a certain range category (say, 1500KM) wold be characterized as nuclear in origin and that they will respond accordingly.

Not to mention a number of issues under START and the like that have to be considered...

There's a lot to be said about boomers in a conventional role and we're going to be learning a lot from the converted Ohios and their deployment and operations. I'm just not convinced of the efficacy of introducing convetional IR-/ICBMs into the mix and needlessly complicating matters when there might be other methods that are less ambiguous.
- SJS

P.S. Great seeing you up and on the 'net!

The Conservative Wahoo said...

As usual Steeljaw, insightful and well said.

We are definitely in a sensitive spot with the Russians, and early warning miscues are definitely something to be worked out. That said, it seems to me that we should continue to move forward with both the development of the conventional Trident approach, the more unambiguous options, and cooperation on shared early warning with Russians. Because things are rough right now does not mean that they must always be.

What of the missile defense and satellite re-seed options? Should they also be canned because they might look like ICBM's?

Anonymous said...

What of the missile defense and satellite re-seed options? Should they also be canned because they might look like ICBM's?

Nope - because the missile defense (and here I'm assuming you mean the GBI's up at Greely and Vandenburg) have a different trajectory and launch azimuth, not to mention coming from areas not characterized as ICBM locations. If Aegis BMD s the question, no again because of burn times, trajectories for intercept points (midcourse) for the SM-3 (Blk 1 and the planned Blk 2) or terminal (Sm-2 Blk 4). Now, KEI, forward deployed via ground or sea-launched - that might be an issue as it is oriented to boost-phase intercept.

Satellite re-seeding may best be accomplished from either an airlaunched platform (which itself could be fairly responsive) or CONUS-based like SAC's Emergency Communications Rocket System. Of course there are alternatives to satellites as well

The Conservative Wahoo said...

I am definitely talking KEI; if the Russian early warning system is as FUBAR as you say it is, I'm not sure any of these weapons is really as easily discerned as we think they might be...still don't think that is a reason to stop the work. Pursue parallel tracks....

Newer Post Older Post Home