In an important policy directive released yesterday, Deputy Secretary of Defense (I wish it were still Secretary of War) England has raised "irregular warfare" to the same level of importance within DoD as "traditional warfare". For those of you who are confused, irregular warfare is basically a lot of stuff that you do against enemies who aren't willing to dress up in battle rattle and drive tanks against you in suicidal resistance. Think irregular warfare when you think of the Iraqi insurgency, of 2003-7, think traditional warfare when you think of Saddam's resistance in 1991. I know this is simplistic, but if you want better insight, go to the military blogs.
I am interested in this subject because the Maritime Strategy with which I was associated while on active duty was I think prescient in how it viewed irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and war in general. We said in that document that the prevention of war was as important as the conduct of war...a very important statement that meant a lot more than simply the deterrence of the mailed fist. It was about raising the importance of maritime security and pro-active humanitarian assistance WITHOUT de-emphasizing traditional Naval missions that involve killing people and wrecking things. We took a lot of criticism from the talking heads in DC for "ignoring the war we are in" in the strategy--which means that we didn't focus maniacally on the Global War on Terror/War in Iraq and Afghanistan. What they missed was that we shot over those wars, aiming at trying to achieve what Assistant Secretary of Defense Vickers refers to in this article as the creation of a "persistent, ubiquitous presence against our adversaries....and essentially smother them over time" Anyone who reads the Maritime Strategy cannot fail to see that in our "globally distributed, mission tailored forces" devoted to maritime security, capacity building and the creation and maintenance of cooperative relationships with other maritime nations.
Anyone who sees in this latest directive a threat to Navy budgets (which is EXACTLY how this will be read by most folks in the DC defense chattering class) failed to read the Maritime Strategy. Where DoD is now headed is simply following in the wake of where the Navy is already going.
Thursday, December 4, 2008
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Another reason why Gates' staying is a good thing for those with the long view. His 2008 Defense Strategy had as part of its vision the need for the military to “display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional warfare.” If it means we buy one less bloated Zumwalt class pork vessel to invest in something that can actually conduct the globally distributed tailored missions you mentioned then that is a step in the right direction IMHO. As capable and necessary our CVNs and CGs are they represent a very poor and disproportionate use of resources to stop maritime banditry.
War does not change... it is the interplay of violence, chance and reason in a contest of will where the environment selects winners and losers.
Warfare, or the form that war takes in the ways and means employed, does change... the severity and ferocity of lethal ways and means shifts across the course of a war based upon the opponents' strategy. Categorization of warfare into distinct types or "regularities" is tidy, convenient and absurd, for the complexities of warfare defy consistent taxonomy. Virtually every war has featured both "regular" and "irregular" elements as the current parlance goes, and the oversimplification of the nature of warfare is strategically perilous.
That aside, the benefit of the Navy and the Maritime Strategy CW describes lies in the absolute scalability of Naval ways and means across all global commons. Since warfare is a continuum, the maritime Services cover the spectrum with scalable capabilities prepared to engage at at discrete point on the continuum (or at least the good ones are). The war prevention effort CW describes is the earnest effort at the low end of the continuum and represents an excellent strategy for preventing emergence of conditions at the higher end which bring costly damages.
But the point is I take exception to any effort to codify a form of warfare arbitrarily or sanctimoniously (the latter being the case with IW in response to perceived failures in the current war) when all that is necessary is for the military Services to educate and develop strategists who demonstrate an understanding of their profession.
Ace---I always enjoyed our talks about strategy. I learn so much.
Ace/CW, Right, but can Gates come out and say, "we must be the winner in the interplay of violence, chance, anc reason in the contest of will?" I don't think so. I think you may be mixing apples and oranges here. I don't think the policy is trying to condify the war as a means to escape the fact that the enemy is not playing by our rules. I think it is a measure to define a mission area in which our troops need to be trained and equipped (i.e. a means) in order to defeat the enemy (the ends). One of the issues I have with some strategies is that they are merely vision statements masquerading as strategy. Strategy requires hard choices - I think this policy represents a choice DoD is making to balance the force. True enough, irregularities existed in past wars (hence the small wars manual) but is the strategic application of those lessons enough to combat the current enemy (who gave rise to the latest field manuals)? Very much appreciate your thoughts.
I am more sympathetic to your view, Anon (but if I hear another "masquerading as a vision statement" shot, I'm gonna get a little peeved. "Beat Germany First" was the strategy in WWII), and I think this is a shot fired across the bow of those who wish to pay lip service to the low end of conflict. This directive means resources WILL have to be applied to these pursuits.
Ace, you are one nutty NeoClausewitzian. You forgot to put out that war is an extension of policy by other means. The holy trinity of chance, violence, and policy is not a strategy. It's theory - a pretty good one at that. But it does not build weapon sysems or train troops to fight the enemy. It should serve as a theoretical backdrop for strategists who make "perillous decisions" about what to put into the minds and hands of our troops.
For the record, I don't think the Maritime Strategy is a vision statement and it is serving it's purpose to influence the direction of the maritime forces (and other forces for that matter). Don't you agree, however, there are vision statements that call themselves strategies out there?
I take your point, Anon, as I share your frustration common to lame "strategists." But like so many things, one can metaphorically get wet on both sides of the dock. Is this case, leaning toward a policy that reflects a philosophical camp that we'll call "The Church of IW" (COIW). The COIW camp will tell you that America, big and strong, has so brutally hosed IW in the past, and now the time has come for the strategic equivalent of the Rapture where the COIW will rise to take its place in the pantheon of interagency heroes. That is, of course, severely hyperbolic in expression, but the magnitude of the hyperbole is roughly equivalent to the type of change such COIW zealots would like to see, and it all begins with a ratification of the notion that IW is a "thing" distinct from "RW" and that militaries must learn to fight both "things."
The problem here is a category mistake much like asking "what does the color blue taste like?" As I mentioned, IW is not a "thing" and neither is "Regular" warfare. War is the "thing" and warfare is the form it takes... a form that is shifting, amorphous, and quantifiable on some occasions and elusive on others.
The solution is this: develop a broad spectrum of capabilities (at an acceptable cost), train strategists to recognize all forms of war known to man along with and historically relevant trends to victory, and teach them how to think about the capabilities at our disposal and how those ways and means can work in concert to bring about our objective. If we go the route we've started on, we'll end up with IW strategists and RW strategists, IW Airmen and RW Airmen, Sailors, and so forth. An unnecessary step rooted in error.
We should think of strategy much like a culinary art. The best Chefs know their ingredients, both in the taste each ingredient has individually as well as in a recipe with other ingredients. The Chef learns of an event, the audience or customer, and the desired effect the dish must create, then he goes to work to combine the ingredients in accordance with, but not necessarily strict adherence to, a recipe. He mixes, bakes, measures, and checks the creation along the way, and samples the dish to see if the taste is as expected, and then serves it up in a meal--the most exquisite of which will include complimentary tastes in wine, salad, and bread.
I know, makes you hungry right? :)
Our strategists should have the ingredients for a great recipe, in this case interoperable Joint capability sets that are of use to varying degree across the spectrum of conflict. Strategists should learn proven recipes (doctrines and concepts), but also taught that strict adherence is not a necessity... they are the chefs of this kitchen. Pick smart folks for this job and watch the wonderful "meals" they create to secure the Nation.
Now, myopia on forms of warfare and parochial bureaucratic interests spoil the soup. So what the DSECDEF should say (I disagree with him, not Gates, in this case) is that we are reshuffling the balance of the capabilities available in order to address the lack of capability we have in this low end conflict.
The difference is this: as a chef doesn't redefine his culinary style for lack of an ingredient... we must focus on purchasing the right ingredients for the right chefs.
Anon2, notice I did not assert the trinity is "strategy" as you say, I used it to define "war." Furthermore war's relationship to policy is an interesting topic, but I did not intend to address it here as we are definitely dealing with matters of theory related to forms of warfare and war.
Your arguments ad hominem do not make your views more compelling in my view.
CIA moved to DoD, so this makes sense. The Directors are Air Force so it makes more sense.
This has been a goal, maybe Plame works for the FSB...........
OK Ace, you had me at COIW. Many thanks to you and CW.
Illius me paenitet, dux. ANON2.
Wow, I'm exhausted, and I still don't understand a single word of what I just read. Kind of like high school calculus all over again...
Anon2, Ego te absolvo. Gratias Ago Tibi.
I was going to make some comment about Red Coats standing in lines while the French hid behind trees with the Indians and shot at them but that is purely assinine in comparison to the previous comments. I echo GW's sentiment.
Sounds good, briefs good, makes us all feel good about turning turret from conventional warfare to the threats which cause us to confront IW. However, the military-industrial-political complex (yes, I add political to the mix, as all these industries have employees/constituents who also vote) will continue to resist. Sure, the policy recognizes that we'll expect more out of Marines and Soldiers, but training them in IW is cheap compared to outfitting them on upgraded Abrams, Bradleys, and other ACAT1 programs (ACAT 1 programs are major defense acquisition programs -- big ticket items for industry and the congressional districts where they do research, development, testing, manufacturing, and assembly). Nothing really brings big money into congressional districts when you are talking about teaching Soldiers and Marines about SOF TTPs, preventing or propping-up failed states, learning cultures and languages, etc. Until we see the funding decreases associated with taking a realistic approach to adopting this policy, the policy will have little relevance, as the Services and Congress will continue their own version of "continued gov't bailout" with the Raytheons, Lockheed Martins, and Northrup-Grummans in the world. It remains to be seen -- will policy drive budget, or will budget drive policy?
Hey Goldwater's Ghost,
Seing terms like "NeoClausewitzian" and "ACAT1 programs" mentioned... doesn't it remind you of the dinner table conversations we'd enjoy with the young CW 30 years ago?
was getting ready to add my two cents when i read the final anon's input. so, in view of his comments, i'll condense my thoughts to "concur with anon". to answer your question, anon, i have become far too cynical about DoD acquisition to see any outcome other than budget driving policy. Which is precisely why I told my Obama-voting sister who explained her vote as a vote for change in Washington, that taking more money from the taxpayers to give to the Congress was going to be the perfect recipe to maintain the status quo, not change it. if you want to change washington, stop feeding it the high calorie diet that helped it grow so big.
TDP
I certainly do...I believe the young CW served as the inspiration for the Alex Keaton character in Family Ties.
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