News here of a devastating attack on an exposed joint US/Afghan outpost Saturday, in which 8 US troops were killed.
Tucked into the report was this bit: "The insurgents struck from positions in a mosque, village buildings and hillside positions above the outpost, which is in the Kamdesh area of Nurestan province."
Mosques, like churches, schools, and hospitals, are protected targets under the law of armed conflict. This protection is not absolute; if a mosque is used for military operations and planning, it becomes a legitimate military target. The problem here is the entering argument that a mosque has a higher level of "off-limits" than say, a hardware store. It is time for that distinction to end. It is time for mosques to lose their protected status.
Many Americans believe that Islamic terrorists, insurgents, and fighters of all variety operate out of mosques because they know darn well Americans will go out of their way not to hit the mosque--and in some cases, this is the truth. But it isn't the whole story. The REST of the story is that operations are planned and executed out of the mosque because THAT'S WHERE THAT KIND OF BUSINESS IS SUPPOSED TO BE TRANSACTED. Much of Islam does not recognize the fundamental "church/state" divide that we here in America spend so much time defending. The mosque isn't just a place of worship; it is a place of justice, it is a place of governance, it is a place of civil administration. To grant protected status to mosques isn't a huge leap from claiming protected status for Army forward operating bases; after all, there are chaplains there and they often conduct religious services. But not only would we never make such a claim--the world would never recognize it. But here we (and the rest of the Western world) are, judging the actions of Islam by Western standards, affording their places of worship the status appropriate to places of worship ONLY. When will we learn.
Monday, October 5, 2009
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The average American has no concept of how the mosque and Islam are the central and controlling theme in the average Muslim’s life. Islam is both a religion and a complete way of life.
Muslims got to sallah (prayer call) five times a day where they are a willing captive audience to the Imam’s interpretation of how they should practice their religion, how they should use it to affect society, and his view of all politics local, national and international.
For better or worse, as devout Muslims, his views become their views.
Just as Islam is not just a religion, but a way of life, the mosque is not just a house of worship, but is the command and control center of all happenings of any import in the area.
Ok CW you're the career military guy so I have a question. What is the difference tactically between anti-terror and counter-insurgency? McChrystal is an expert in one, Petraeus the other. What are they specifically, what are the troop demands, how do I know what level of force is necessary? I'm probably too dumb in this area to even ask the right questions so feel free to elaborate (not much taught at ASA school or Signal school in this area).
Thanks.
GHD--I guess I could go to official definitions, but then it would be less fun. So I'll give you my understanding of the terms.
Counterinsurgency--is an effort to suppress those forces (insurgents) attempting to overthrow/destabilize a government that is still largely in control and exercising power. Insurgents sometimes operate with the support of the "people", and sometimes gain their support through terror and fear. In either case, counterinsurgency aims to isolate the insurgents from the general population so as to neutralize their destabilizing impact. This includes security operations, economic assistance, lots of troops living closeby and visible--the kinds of things Petraeus et al did in Iraq (and what McChrystal is trying to do in Afghanistan).
Counter-terrorism is focused on the killing and capture of terrorists, without regard to the population. There can be a counter-terrorism element to a counterinsurgency, but it is only a part of the larger counterinsurgency effort.
Those who wish to leave Afghanistan and pursue the war there with special forces, UAV's, precision guided munitions and attack aircraft are arguing for a "counter-terrorism" strategy--kill the bad guys.
Those who wish to stay, increase troop levels, disburse into the population to provide security and assistance--all aimed at turning a population against insurgents--are pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy.
CW -- not a bad summation for a Navy guy who can't even sail.
What appears to be lost in the kerfluffle is that the President has failed to tell us what the objective of his Afghanistan strategy is.
First of all, who am I to talk strategy on the Blog of the author of the Maritime Strategy (which is now carried as a public service commercial on AFN channels here in the AOR)? But, since CW upped the "fun" quotient by defining counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, I figured I could do the same wrt strategy formulation. Yes, I know CW, you are loath to boiling-down the complexities and nuances of strategy into the basics of "Ends," "Ways," and "Means." But what is important here is that the President has missed the basics -- he has not told us what he wants as the Objective or "Ends." Instead, he and his advisors are giving us the "Ways."
Let's say that the "Ends" is Afghanistan as a free and democratic city on a shining hill. The "Ways" then becomes Counter-Insurgency, and the "Means" becomes GEN McCrystal's 40,000 Soldiers (more like 240,000. "Shhhh.....quiet, GEN Shinseki"). This would be called, "COA Dream."
If the "Ends" is Afghanistan can no longer be a terrorist haven, the "Ways" become Counter-terrorism, and the "Means" becomes the Global Hawk and Predator air armada, 1,000+ TLAMS, a couple hundred of the 2000-pound bombs I put CW's name on last week, Special Ops Direct Action, and military teams of ANA advisors to try and assist their military and law enforcement. This would be called, "COA W-t Dream."
Whichever "Ends" the President decides upon, he needs to bring himself to his tele-prompter oratorical best and present his case. Either way, it will be a tough sell.
In COA "Dream," he'll have to sell the Democratic Congress and American public that Afghanistan is worth our efforts, blood, and treasure. That is is governable. That we don't abandon the ideas of spreading democracy. That we believe in the hope and future of Afghanistan. That this "End" is "Change You Can Believe In."
In COA "W-t Dream," he'll have to sell the idea that we are not cutting and running and abandoning our ideals of the promotion of democracy. Believe me, this is extremely important in the eyes of the foreign military leaders I have talked to here, as they already perceive that the President is not as strong in promoting democratic ideals as his predecessor. He needs to say that we were wrong in our initial approach in Afghanistan. That history has proven time and again that Afghanistan is a land of ungovernable constituencies. That Afghanistan now has a BIG RED TARGET painted on it that we will bomb and attack, from afar, with impunity. And his message should continue to the other countries out there, that in the future, if you want U.S. help, you better prove that you are worthy of the expenditure of American blood and treasure.
And, once the President identifies the "Ends" for Afghanistan, then the military will do some MDMP, as it will change the facts and assumptions planners take into account as they determine the best ways and means. Sure, there will be much hand-wringing about whether or not counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency are feasible "Ways," and whether or not uses of certain aspects of our military power are appropriate "Means." But, at least from the military approach, we know we are applying "Ways" and "Means" to the President's "Ends."
There is a saying:
"Don't let the Fog-of-War start with Commander's Intent."
Very informative gentlemen, thank you. So, if I understand you guys correctly, at this moment in time we are ostensibly fighting a counter-insurgency war with no defined goals while ignoring the advice of the commanders on the ground due to a loud and vocal anti-war left? That's comforting. Deja vu all over again?
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